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FOREWORD: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
DAVID

M. EBELt

Because I'm a little concerned about whether you will find the topic
of judicial independence very interesting, I thought back to one of my
favorite authors, Mark Twain-Samuel Clemens. He went to Europe and
wrote letters back to the bumpkins in America about what civilized life
in Europe was like. Those letters were collected in a delightful book entitled, Innocents Abroad. One letter addressed what it was like to attend a
Wagner concert. He started out his essay by saying, you know, "Wagner's music is not as bad as it sounds."
Similarly, I think I can assure you that the topic of judicial independence is not as boring as it sounds. The reason I can say that is because I have traveled all over the world on behalf of the American Judiciary to talk about judicial independence. I've been to developing countries, like Rwanda; Arab countries like the United Arab Emirates and
Qatar; and modern well-developed countries like Canada and Russia.
Everywhere I go, I find admiration and envy for the judicial independence that we have in America.
Those countries may not like our government, they may not like our
president, they may not like our policies, but they all like and admire our
judicial independence. And they want to know how we achieved it.
It's quite an interesting story-how we developed judicial independence. Of course, there are many chapters still to be written in this
story, and you young law students will be writing some of those chapters.
At the very end of this lecture, I have several suggestions I would like
you to consider.
But first I want to define judicial independence. Then, I want to discuss our history and how we obtained judicial independence, because it
turns out to be a very rare thing. I want to talk about some of the threats
to judicial independence that we are facing today. Finally, I will discuss
some things you can do to help preserve this almost unique asset we have
in America.
So first, what is judicial independence?
When I go abroad people say, ah, it must be wonderful, you're a
judge, you can do anything you want. You can order the president to do
this or that. You can order people to come and go and they come and go.
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. This Article is based on
Judge Ebel's remarks delivered to students at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
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You are really independent, and you have all this fabulous power. Nothing could be further from the truth.
From an institutional point of view we have almost no independence. We can't create our own budget. We can't fund ourselves, only
Congress can do that. We can't appoint our own members, only the
President with the consent of the Senate can do that-(this speech addresses the federal system, but much of what I say applies to the states as
well). We can't remove our members. Only Congress can do that by impeachment. We can't even establish our own jurisdiction. Congress could
eliminate all federal courts tomorrow under the Constitution-save only
the Supreme Court. And Congress can limit the jurisdiction of what we
can hear, and what we can decide at their will. Congress even can impose
jurisdictional restrictions on the Supreme Court.
That doesn't sound like the judiciary is very independent.
And we can't even enforce our decrees when we issue an order because we have no army to ensure compliance. So institutionally, we lack
independence and we are quite weak.
But what protects the judiciary is that the other branches are also
weak in other ways. Our strength comes not from independence but
rather from the co-dependency that each branch has upon the other
branches of government. The judicial branch is the only branch that can
definitively interpret the laws and resolve cases and controversies. The
judicial branch can enforce constitutional limits on the other two
branches and, of course, upon itself as well. Those are powerful tools.
So when people say that we have an independent judiciary, I say,
no. The judicial branch is co-dependent on the other branches, but happily the other branches are co-dependent upon the judicial branch as
well.
A better way to look at independence is not institutionally, but
rather as independence in our decision-making process.
When we make judicial decisions, we make them free of anybody
else interfering with our decision-making process, subject of course to
our need to obey and be bound by the Constitution first, and the constitutional laws of the land.
In twenty-two years as a judge, no one has ever called me ex parte
and tried to persuade me how to decide a case. I have never had a government official tell me what to do, or even suggest it. I have never had
an offer of a bribe or intimation of a bribe. I have never had a politician,
a legislator, or a president call me and say, this is the way we want you to
decide the case. And that fact alone makes us nearly unique among the
world's judiciaries.
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When I went to another large and well-developed country, I asked
the President of the bar of their major city about the independence of
their judiciary. I asked, if you took their significant cases (putting aside
the routine fender benders), what percentage of those cases were decided
solely on the merits, and what percentage were, instead, decided or influenced by bribery or government interference?
You know what he told me?
He said that maybe ten percent of such cases are decided strictly on
the merits, and about ninety percent are decided because the government
has called the judge and told him how to decide the case or there was ex
parte pressure or bribery involved.
Once that cancer sets into a country, it is almost impossible to excise it.

In America, if you get into a legal dispute, there is a place to go
where nobody is going to be bribing or threatening or imposing ex parte
influence or persuasion on the decision-making. That place is called the
courts.
So I would define judicial independence as a judiciary that decides
cases under the rules that are presented to it, under the evidence that is
presented to it, where all the litigants have an equal and open opportunity
to address the merits. Judicial independence really boils down to independence from outside influences in making judicial decisions. It may
not be as grandiose or sexy as some of my envious friends in foreign
countries imagine, but it is every bit as important and unique as they understand it to be.
Now, how did this judicial independence come about?
Many countries have similar constitutional guarantees of judicial
independence, but it doesn't always play out in practice the way it has in
America.
So let me talk a little bit about the history of our country, because
how judicial independence came about is really interesting. Let's go back
to the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776. It lists 25 reasons why
we were going to break off from Great Britain. And of those 25 reasons,
two explicitly talk about an independent judiciary. Isn't that interesting?
Approximately one-tenth of the grievances that lead to our independence
had to do with King George's interference with the independence of the
judiciary.
One of those grievances complained that King George was exercising influence over our judges by threatening to fire them or by reducing
their salaries. And the second complained that King George wouldn't let
us set up our own judiciary.
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Thus, an independent judiciary is on our birth certificate. It is part
of who we are and why we became a separate country.
Next, let's turn to the Constitution. It addresses judicial independence in Article III. And it says: All judicial power is vested in the Courts.
Then it defines judicial power to say: Judicial power is the right to resolve all cases arising under the Constitution, the statutes, or the treaties.
Wow. Any case, any dispute involving the Constitution, statutes, or
treaties, is vested in the judicial branch.
When I was in Malaysia I learned that about twenty years ago they
had a similar provision in their constitution that all judicial power was
vested in the Courts. But about twenty years ago Malaysia took that out
of their Constitution. There is an effort now in Malaysia to try to restore
the earlier provision back into their constitution.
With a specific nod to King George, we put another provision in our
Constitution that said federal judges have life tenure and judges' pay
can't be diminished during their lifetime.
But it took a lot more than these constitutional provisions to establish judicial independence in America. It took some very wise decisions
by some very wise judges to slowly take a step forward on independence,
and then maybe half a step back, and then a step sideways, and then two
steps forward, and then a step back.
The route to judicial independence had to be earned. It wasn't just
given to us full blown.
You all know the case of Marbury v. Madison, which was the case
where Chief Justice Marshall declared that judges have the power to declare statutes unconstitutional.
We all remember the principle of that case. But you may not know
how remarkable that principle was at the time. It may seem normal now.
But it was shocking at the time because we were founded as a democracy. And the Constitution says all power comes from the people. There
is undeniable tension between ultimate power residing in the people and
their elected representatives and the power of the courts to strike down
laws passed by those representations.
The people, through their elected representatives, can pass a lawthat is the very embodiment of democracy. But the courts can set that law
aside if it violates the Constitution. That was not a self-evident proposition, although now we have come to appreciate it as the embodiment of a
"constitutional" democracy.
How did the other branches of government allow Chief Justice Marshall to come up with that rule that the courts can strike down legislation
that is unconstitutional? The Constitution does not explicitly permit that
action.
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Well, what had happened was there was a sharply contested election
between Jefferson and the incumbent President, John Adams. President
Adams was running for re-election against Jefferson and Jefferson beat
him.
But, before Jefferson could take office, John Adams tried to appoint
his loyalist cronies to government positions wherever he could.
And one of the people he wanted to appoint to a magistrate judicial
position was Marbury. So a judicial commission was issued for Marbury
to become a judge, the Senate approved it, and Adams signed it.
But before he could deliver the commission to Marbury (which was
required before it could become effective), Adam's term ended, and Jefferson became President. Jefferson said, I'm not going to deliver that
commission to Marbury. So, Marbury sued.
But here's the twist. Marbury brought his suit directly in the Supreme Court. He didn't sue in the lower courts and let it work its way up
on appeal. He sought the Supreme Court's direct original jurisdiction and
asked the Supreme Court to issue a mandamus to Jefferson's Secretary of
State, Madison, to force him to deliver the commission.
Everybody was scared to death about that case, because they knew
that if the Supreme Court ordered Madison to deliver the mandamus to
get Marbury seated as a judge, Jefferson wouldn't obey it. And it would
provoke a terrific conflict. You can't have an independent judiciary if the
executive branch won't enforce judicial decrees?
So Chief Justice Marshall did an amazing thing. He said, yes, Marbury should get his commission. But Marbury is seeking Supreme Court
original jurisdiction to issue a mandamus forcing Madison to seat him.
And that original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus comes only
from a statute recently passed by the new Congress giving the Supreme
Court original mandamus jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court then found that jurisdictional statute to be unconstitutional. The Constitution lists a couple of specific areas where the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction. But all of the rest of the cases
have to come up to the Supreme Court through appellate jurisdiction.
There are only a couple categories of cases listed in the Constitution that
can be filed in the first instance in the Supreme Court. And a mandamus
action is not one of them.
The Court ruled that when Congress tried to give the Supreme Court
additional power to issue a mandamus as a matter of original jurisdiction,
it exceeded the Supreme Court's constitutional authority and hence that
statute was unconstitutional. And because the Supreme Court could not
give Mr. Marbury the mandamus he wanted, they threw his claim out of
court.
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Ah, Jefferson was happy. The Supreme Court was not going to
force him to seat Marbury as a judge. Congress was happy because to
Congress this looked like a modest, self-effacing Supreme Court decision
rejecting additional judicial authority that Congress tried to give to it. In
this early jockeying for power, that seemed to satisfy the new two
branches.
The other branches of government, therefore, accepted the decision,
and yet we now understand that it announced, for the first time, the most
powerful weapon that the judiciary has-the power to strike down laws
that are unconstitutional.
I can talk about a lot of other cases that contributed to our current
understanding of judicial independence, but the point I make is that judicial independence in our country wasn't just birthed fully clothed the day
our country was created. It was slowly developed, step-by-step, by very
astute judges.
I was next going to talk about the New Deal cases. There are some
interesting stories there, but I don't have time. I'm going to skip that. I'm
going to just jump forward to Bush v. Gore.
One of the things that Marbury v. Madison announced was the doctrine called political question abstention. That is, if a case presents essentially a political rather than a legal issue, the Court is not going to get
involved. A political fight is kind of like punching a tar baby. If the
courts weigh in on political fights, that will get mired in a morass.
Besides that, if the courts get involved in a political fight, the public
is going to see the courts as political and partisan. And then the courts
lose their indispensible asset of being viewed as neutral, objective, and
above the fray.
So the Court announced in Marbury that political disputes between
Adams and Jefferson were beyond the wisdom and jurisdiction of the
Court. And the Court has followed the doctrine of political question abstention almost uniformly since then.
Twice we had contested presidential elections that were thrown into
the Senate for resolution. One involved Rutherford B. Hayes and one
involved the Jefferson/Adams election. And in both cases it was Congress that decided which delegates to seat, which electoral college votes
to count, which ones not to count, which states to count, which ones to
disallow.
So when Bush v. Gore came along I was very surprised that the
Court took jurisdiction. I had predicted that it wouldn't.
Now, I have nothing to say about the outcome of the case-no
comment on whether I thought it was a good outcome or a bad outcome
or whether the merits were rightly or wrongly decided. I'm speaking only

2011]

FOREWORD: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

3 19

about the question of jurisdiction, whether the case should have been
taken at all by the Court. In my opinion, the "political question" doctrine
strongly counseled that judges stay out of basic political fights. Those
fights should be resolved ultimately by Congress.
I think my judge colleagues will mostly agree that the judiciary has
paid a heavy price for Bush v. Gore. It has resulted in a loss of public
confidence that the judiciary is politically neutral.
This loss of public confidence in the apolitical nature of the courts
is exacerbated by the fact that, with two exceptions, the Republican justices, that is the justices that were appointed by a Republican president,
supported Bush. All the justices appointed by the Democrats supported
Gore.
If the public ever really comes to believe that the judicial branch is
just another political branch of government, all is lost, because we have
no armies, we have no budget, we have no constituents. Our authority
ultimately rests on our reputation of neutrality and integrity.
Now, let me now speak about some of the current events that
threaten to undermine judicial independence.
One of the threats to judicial independence goes to our competence.
You see, the country will not continue to support judicial independence if
they don't believe judges are competent. Why should it? I mean, if
judges as a whole are not competent, of course the other branches would
want oversight over us.
So we have to prove with every case, every day, that we're competent. And that is getting to be increasingly difficult, because the laws are
getting increasingly complex. And the resources available to the judiciary are becoming increasingly scant.
Let me talk about how complex the laws are getting. Think of the
last time you ate a hamburger at McDonald's. That may have been yesterday. How many separate laws do you think had to be complied with
from the time that hamburger was born as a baby calf in Wyoming to the
time you ate it?
Somebody with way too much time on their hands actually calculated that. And they counted, as a separate law, every statutory provision
that had a different citation to it. So if there was a big statute that had 20
sections and 10 subsections, they would count each of those subsections
that would apply as a separate statutory obligation.
How many different statutory obligations had to be satisfied? A
hundred? Five hundred? The answer is 72,000; 72,000 ways that a federal judge could be involved in a judicial challenge to the making of a
hamburger for your eating pleasure. The first ninety days I was a judge I
had labor cases, tax cases, discrimination cases, environmental cases,
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coal cases, capital punishment cases, bankruptcy, an assassination attempt on the President, and dozens and dozens of other issues. How
could I possibly master all of those things?
And, unfortunately, judicial resources are dwindling. They're dwindling in the salaries paid to judges. They're dwindling in the resources
that support us, research, and so forth. What do you think the percentage
of the U.S. budget is that is allocated to the entire judicial branch? Of
course, the judiciary does not aspire to thirty-three percent of the budget
even though the judiciary is one of the three coequal branches of government. I mean, we would be happy with ten percent. Seems like a
modest enough proposal. We don't even come close to ten percent.
Okay, I'm going to set my sights really low. I'll take one percent of
the federal budget for our coequal branch of the government. We don't
even get that. We get two-tenths of one percent of the U.S. budget to
fund the entire judicial branch. That's less than is spent to fund a midsized administrative agency. It's less than it costs to build one aircraft
carrier or three submarines. So the judicial budget is very tight.
That goes all the way from our support staff and our resources, to
our salaries. I took a two-thirds pay cut to become a judge. And since
then my judicial salary has fallen way below the inflation index.
In the last two years we've had two of our best active circuit judges
on the Tenth Circuit leave for more lucrative private engagements. It's
becoming a real problem.
And the funding problem is a hundred times worse in the states. I
am not at all claiming sympathy for the federal judiciary, because any
state court judge would say, my goodness, it is so much worse at the state
level.
But just to describe our workload. We are now deciding, on the
Court of Appeals, three times as many cases per judge per year as the
Court of Appeals judges had to decide in 1960.
If you asked a judge in 1960, are you overworked? They would say,
oh, man, am I overworked. And then if you said, we're going to fire two
of your colleagues and you have to do the work of three judges. They
would say, there is no way that is possible. Yet today each federal appellate judge decides three times as many cases as a single judge decided in
1960 on a yearly basis. Today I decide about 500 cases a year. Think of
what a case involves, up to 125 pages of briefs, thousands of pages of
record, precedent that has to be read and understood. And I have to decide about two of those every single day.
Another threat we face in the judiciary to independence goes to ethics. We have rules about ethics, what you can and can't do. I sat for
many years on the national Ethics Advisory Committee. And I now sit on
the National Appeals Committee for Ethical Changes. We do a good job
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of enforcing judicial ethics. But some in Congress think they can do better.
And so there is periodically a bill introduced into Congress to establish an inspector general's office for oversight of the courts. Well, that
would be disastrous to the concept of judicial independence because of
the intimidation Congress could exert by such oversight over our daily
decisions. If someone thinks we are being "activist"-whatever that
means-they could start an investigation. And so, we have to convince
Congress that we're doing a good job of policing ourselves. And that's
hard to do, because much of our policing is done below the radar level.
We do occasionally recommend that a judge be impeached by Congress. But 99% of the time we can handle these matters more effectively
under the radar. We must, somehow, convince the American public that
we are serious about our own internal policing of compliance with judicial ethics rules.
Finally, let me suggest a few things that you can do to help preserve
and advance judicial independence.
One thing you can do is to get involved with the Institute for the
Advancement of the American Legal System. It is one of the premiere
institutes in America devoted to the independence of the judiciary and
the betterment of the Courts. It's located just across the street, and my
dear friend, Rebecca Love Kourlis, a former State Supreme Court Justice, runs it. They are doing things all over the country to ensure the independence of judges, integrity, competence, resources-all of those
things that I said you have to have to be independent.
You ought to find out about that institute. You ought to go over
there and see if you can volunteer your time. I know they have a bunch
of researchers, and I bet they could use more.
The second thing you can do is to be our constituency, because
judges don't have constituencies. We're not elected. We don't have anybody to come to our defense. When we're accused of a bad decision or
being an activist judge, often, at least when I know something about the
decision under attack, the criticism is misinformed. You see, the political
branches of government look at the world very differently from the way
a judge looks at the world. The political branches look at the world
largely by the end results. Did this decision advance abortion or did it
advance pro-life? Did it advance the environment, or did it advance corporations? Did it advance the tenant or did it advance the landlord?
That's what they look at. The political branches say, well, the judge was
pro-tenant, pro-landlord, pro this, pro that, or whatever, based on the end
result of the decision.
That's not the way judges look at things. Judges tend to focus on
process and let the end result wind up wherever it may. Judges ask, what
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are the rules? What does the statute say? What does the Constitution say?
What is the precedent? What is the evidence? What is our standard of
proof? Measure those things together. Once you get the ingredients together, the soup takes care of itself. I can't tell you how many times I tell
my clerks, after we have gone through that ingredients analysis, that I
may not personally like the end result of my own decision. But whether I
personally like or dislike a result is not the criteria by which I decide
cases.
I never issued a ruling because I'm pro this or pro that. Why? Because a judge cannot rule on the basis of the end result achieved without
sacrificing neutrality and fairness and those are higher values in the judicial world.
We need people like you to spread the word that judging is different
than the way the other two branches of government operate. The judiciary is not a result-oriented branch. It is a process-oriented branch. And
the process is to ensure fair and objective trials-nothing more and nothing less.
If a decision is being criticized politically, we need you to review
that case and then publicize your own legal analysis of the decision. Get
involved and explain how judges work and how the law works. If the
case is wrong, we deserve to be criticized. If it's right, tell people about
the process that lead to the decision.
We had a case that Judge Henry, our recent Chief Judge, wrote
years ago involving a prisoner in state prison that wanted estrogen treatment. She had gotten a transsexual operation and was now a transvestite
woman, although she had started out life as a male. She wanted hormone
treatments to support her new femininity. She sued the prison asking for
hormone treatments. The district judge granted summary judgment for
the prison without converting it to a summary judgment and without giving her a chance to put on evidence. Judge Henry looked at that and said,
you can't grant a summary judgment without telling both sides that
you're going to convert the matter to summary judgment and without
giving the parties a chance to put on evidence. So he reversed summary
judgment for the prison and sent it back for evidence so that both sides
could put on their evidence and have their day in court.
What happened? There was a storm of criticism. Three or four congressmen threatened to introduce a Bill of Impeachment against Judge
Henry as an activist judge because he was allegedly supporting transgender rights at the cost of taxpayers' money. And it wasn't until some
law professors and some law students and some lawyers spoke up and
said that every law professor in the country would have agreed with
Judge Henry. It was a process case. Judge Henry had not decided that a
prisoner had a right to estrogen treatment in jail; he had only decided that
the plaintiflfprisoner had a right to her day in court to argue her case. The
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politicians in both the executive and legislative branches do not think
much about process. And you have to educate the public about that.
Well, very quickly, other things you can do. You can advocate for
adequate funding for judges. And leave the federal judges out of it, because we are, by most standards, well paid, and we have life tenure. State
judges really need money. They are woefully underfunded. Get active in
urging adequate funding for the state judiciary.
Another thing you can do is file a complaint if you think a judge is
acting unethically. You know, an ethics complaint does not require
standing. It's the only court-like proceeding I know of that doesn't require standing. You don't need to be a lawyer in the case. You don't
need to be a party in the case.
If you think a judge is acting unethically, the judge is biased, the
judge belongs to biased clubs, the judge has been intemperate on the
bench, the judge has acted improperly off the bench, the judge is arrogant, the judge is not listening, whatever, file a complaint and let us deal
with it. We can only resolve the problem when complaints come in. We
need to keep our own house clean and private complaints of judicial misconduct help us to spot problems so we can correct them internally.
And then the final thing for you to consider is that when you reach
the ripe old age of mid-forties or early fifties, some of you should consider throwing your hat in the ring for a judicial career.
It is one of the most wonderful jobs I can imagine. But I don't think
you should do it early in your careers, because you need a lot of experience first. And you need the strength of character that comes from years
of battling in the mine fields in order to insist on judicial independence.
See, you see, hopefully, the topic of judicial independence is not as
boring as it sounds.

